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Research on media and contentious politics in the Arab world point to the vital role that 
social media played in the Arab Spring. For the purposes of this article, the Arab Spring is 
defined as a series of demonstrations and democratic uprisings—and in the cases of Libya, 
Syria, and Yemen armed rebel movements—that arose independently and spread across 
the Arab world from Tunisia and Egypt to Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria in 2010-2011 
and beyond. This article advances the theoretical assumption that while not causing the 
Arab uprisings, New Media (defined here as all forms of digital communication technology 
including satellite television, cell phones, social networking, video-blogging, and citizen 
journalism platforms that allow broader dissemination and participation than traditional 
print or broadcast media) provided the technical infrastructure for these uprisings to 
develop, sustain, and intensify over relatively short periods. With this assumption at its 
focus, this paper digs out the political, economic, social, and cultural roots of the Arab 
Spring. It explores how Arabs’ hunger for decentralized news and information paved the 
road for the organic growth of a new breed of Arab “citizen journalists.” It describes how 
New Media technologies, which Larry Diamond (2012) of Stanford University calls 
“Liberation Technologies” have combined words and images on iPhones, Blackberries, 
laptops, and social media platforms and managed to turn previously underground 
oppositions in several Arab countries into Virtual Public Spheres. It explains how the so-
called “Generation-in-Waiting” who could no longer wait and took to the streets in waves 
of demonstrations against police brutality, economic deprivation, corruption and 
dictatorship. It then examines how these Liberation Technologies helped to convert Arab 
subjects into engaged citizens. It assesses how these revolutionaries broke the government 
monopoly on traditional media and used New Media to mobilize, organize, and take to the 
streets. Furthermore, it explains how this enabled the Arab revolutionaries to “occupy” in 
a matter of days, not just the virtual cyber-space, but also the physical space including 
Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis, Tahrir Square in Cairo, Pearl Square in Manama, and 
the University Quarter in Sanaa, which ultimately brought the fall of entrenched dictators 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Ali Abdullah Saleh of 
Yemen, and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Finally, the paper addresses the challenges 
academics have, and will likely continue to face, as we seek to measure, analyze, and assess 
the role of social media in political dissent and revolution.  
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What’s in a name? Dissecting Similarities and Differences in Uprisings 
 
To date, there is no official and consistent consensus on what to call the revolutionary 
movements that have spread across the Arab world beginning in December 2010 in 
Tunisia, spreading to Egypt, Yemen, and Libya in 2011, and still going on in countries like 
Syria and Bahrain. Some analysts call these movements the “Arab Spring” drawing on the 
eastern European precedents of 1989, which in turn draws on the Prague Spring of 1968. 
Others refer to the events as the “Arab democratic wave.” A third group of observers call 
these movements the “Arab rebellion.” A plurality of Arab analysts and supporters of these 
revolutionary movements prefer to describe them as an “Arab Awakening,” an expression 
with clear antecedents in the social, national, constitutional, and even Islamic modern 
reformist movements of the 19th and early 20th centuries in this part of the world. 
Whatever various analysts and observers call these movements, they unanimously agree 
that these popular uprisings in the Arab world are certainly historical game changers 
(Willis, 2011). When western observers and media analysts started to use the term “Arab 
Spring” to refer to the demonstrations and protests that spread across the Arab world in 
2011, it was not the first time the term was used in an Arab context. Back in 2005, western 
observers used the term “Beirut Spring” and the “Cedar Revolution” interchangeably to 
describe the Lebanese mass demonstrations against the Syrian military presence in their 
country, following the assassination of then prime minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 
2005. The protesters demanded an end to what they perceived as the Syrian occupation of 
Lebanon, resignation of the pro-Syrian Prime Minister Omar Karami and his cabinet, and 
holding free parliamentary elections. The initial success of these demonstrations that 
resulted in the pull out of the Syrian troops from Lebanon and the collapse of the Karami 
government were touted by some western politicians and media experts as clear signs that 
democracy was coming to the Arab world via Beirut.  
 As events unfolded in the following months, the Beirut spring unfortunately proved to 
be more wishful thinking than a social or political reality. This did not stop 
neoconservatives in and outside the George W. Bush administration from promoting a 
belief that the American invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime 
would bring Jeffersonian Democracy to the country and spark a democratization wave in 
the Arab world. Beginning in March 2005, those conservative ideologues started to use the 
term “Arab Spring” as part of the foreign policy lexicon in their appearances on 
conservative and mainstream media outlets. As a consequence, numerous media 
commentators in the United States began to use the term Arab Spring to suggest that a spin-
off benefit of the invasion of Iraq would be the flowering of western-friendly Arab 
democracies. The 2003 assumption died in the long Iraq war and the failure of the post-
war democratic experience in the current failed state of Iraq.  
 Several years later, the self-immolation of a young Tunisian street vender, Mohamed 
Bouazizi on December 17, 2010, sparked an Arab mass fire which is still (in 2015) burning 
and is often referred to as the Arab Spring. A Lexis-Nexis search on the use of the term 
Arab Spring to describe the recent Arab uprisings shows that the term first appeared on 
January 14, 2011, in a Christian Science Monitor editorial about the fall of Tunisia’s 
dictator Ben Ali. then on January 25, the first day of the Egyptian “Facebook revolution,” 
Mohamed al Baradei, Egyptian opposition leader, Nobel peace prize winner, and former 
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director general of the international atomic energy agency (IAEA), used the term “Arab 
Spring” to characterize the democratization movements in the Arab world in an interview 
for the German magazine Der Spiegel (Follath, 2011). The term thereafter became an 
intrinsic part of the framing of news about the Arab upheavals of 2011 in global media. 
while some scholars approach the “Arab Spring” as though it were a monolithic 
phenomenon, others (Baines, 2012) rightly point out the fact that while there were several 
common features and similarities among these democratic movements in various Arab 
countries, there was much about each of them that was unique. These scholars noted both 
the common threads of the Arab democratic movements as well as the uniqueness of each 
individual movement.  
 Despite the recognized fact that the Arab uprisings were not a monolithic 
phenomenon, they do share many common features worth noting. These include high 
numbers of youth participation, a structure lacking traditional hierarchical leadership, non-
violent forms of contentious politics, evolving goals, and a degree of shared Arabic 
language and cultural practices- contributing to shared slogans and protest tactics.  
 
Youth-Driven and New Media-Channeled Large Protests 
 
All Arab uprisings included large demonstrations primarily driven by younger citizens 
using New Media such as cell phones and social networking platforms to organize, 
mobilize, and circumvent state controls over traditional media and public spheres. The New 
Media we are referring to here are not just technologies that function as delivery systems. 
They are also participatory cultural systems (Jenkins, 2006). While the role of more 
seasoned protesters is not to be ignored, the high numbers of youth participation in the 
uprisings, and their particular reliance on and tendency to innovate with New Media is of 




The Arab Uprisings did not take the shape of traditional protest movements. Initially, the 
uprisings lacked any visible leadership, charismatic individuals, or vanguard groups in any 
of the grass roots movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen (Shah & Sardar, 
2011). As Merrick Nelson (2012) noted, the Internet-based New Media allowed many 
individuals the opportunity to participate in these uprisings to create change. These 
revolutions did not begin nor were they sustained by any international forces or opposition 
political parties. They came into being and continued by grassroots mobilization of dis-
satisfied citizens. Traditional political ideologies and political parties were in fact absent 
from many of the Arab protests, at least in their early stages. Even Islamists, the purportedly 
best-organized political opposition groups in Egypt and Tunisia, were playing catch-up 
with the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. This particular trait of the Arab uprisings proved 
to be an asset rather than a deficit for these uprisings. Had there been visible leaders, it 
would have been far easier for the dictatorial powers of Ben Ali in Tunis, Mubarak in 
Egypt, and Ali Saleh in Yemen to target them for arrest or worse, and thus decapitate the 
revolutions in their respective countries. The absence of consistently recognized protest 
leaders and official mouthpieces for the uprisings made a top down approach to quelling 
dissent virtually impossible for dictators. 
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 What form did leadership take in the various uprisings? Howard and Associates at the 
Project on Information Technology and Political Islam at the University of Washington 
assert that instead of a revolutionary leadership, there were prominent nodes in the digital 
networks, people whose contributions held sway, and managed to organize and mobilize 
turnout (Howard et al., 2011, p. 10). Instead of known or identifiable political leaders, there 
were what may be called “Digerati”—a portmanteau, derived from “digital” and literati—
who are active participants in, or are in-the-know of, the digital revolution, or simply, those 
who may be considered members of the elite of the online communities in these countries. 
With no immediately easily identifiable leaders for these uprisings, the approach chosen 
by oppressive governments of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Ali Saleh was bloody crackdown on 
protesters in the streets, a path that Libya’s Qaddafi took until his demise and Syria’s 
Bashar al Assad seems to be following to date (Ross, 2011).  
 
Non-Violent Forms of Contentious Politics 
 
These demonstrations/uprisings were mostly, or at least began as, non-violent forms of 
contentious politics. They reflected acts of desperation and highlighted the public’s 
frustration over inadequate living standards, police brutality, high unemployment, and 
human rights violations. In the absence of known individual leaders or well-structured 
group leadership in the early stages, the goals of the Arab Spring were mostly implicit and 
evolving over the life span of each uprising. These goals ranged from improved economic 
conditions to regime change, advancing human rights, and free and fair elections.  
 
Shared Arabic Language and Culture, Shared Slogans, and Protest Tactics 
 
During the uprisings, shared Arabic language facilitated cross-use of the same slogans and 
tactics of contentious politics in multiple Arab Spring countries. Having multiple related 
goals, revolutionaries in each Arab country used many of the same slogans and tactics as 
Arab citizens in other countries, learning from the successes of revolutionary movements 
in these Arab countries. For example, David D. Kirkpatrick and David E. Sanger of the 
New York Times reported on February 14, 2011, just three days after the fall of Hosni 
Mubarak about how protesters in Tahrir Square drew lessons from their counterparts in 
Tunisia. According to the report, young Egyptian revolutionaries had exchanged ideas and 
advice with their fellow Tunisians. One of these exchanges was a piece of advice protesters 
in Tahrir Square posted on Facebook during their face off against pro-Mubarak forces. It 
read, “Advice to the youth of Egypt: Put vinegar or onion under your scarf for tear gas” 
(Kirkpatrick & Sanger, 2011). Kirkpatrick and Sanger concluded that this “Exchange on 
Facebook was part of a remarkable two-year collaboration that had given birth to a new 
force in the Arab world (2011, para 1). They further noted that, “Young Egyptian and 
Tunisian activists brainstormed on the use of technology to evade surveillance, 
commiserated about torture, and traded practical tips on how to stand up to rubber bullets 
and organize barricades” (Kirkpatrick & Sanger, 2011, para 3). 
 Another example is citizen journalist Gigi Ibrahim who declared, “the Tunisian 
revolution is being twitterized ... history is being written by the people (Howard & Hussain, 
2013). This occurred just after Egyptians heard that Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14, 
2011. Blogger Tarek Shalaby echoed with, “We will follow it!” (Howard & Hussain, 2013, 
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p. 53). On January 25, 2011, journalist Hossam el-Hamalawy noted that “tens of thousands 
r protesting [with] the same chants as the Tunisians” (Howard & Hussein, 2013, p. 53). In 
the aftermath of an unexpectedly large turnout in Egypt that day, Mahmoud Salem—the 
blogger and activist also known as “Sandmonkey”—urged his Twitter followers to “please 
remember, it took a month of protests 4 Tunis revolution 2 succeed . . . Persistence is 
everything” (Arafa, 2013, p. 99).  
 Two of the most common tactics that were shared by revolutionaries of the Arab 
Spring in various Arab countries were the use of New Media, and the utilization of central 
squares as important physical gathering points in major cities. 
 
The Use of New Media  
 
Young Arabs were some of the first to incorporate the use of the New Media technologies 
as tools to build and sustain their protest networks and democratization movements. 
Protestors in the Arab world “appropriated, redefined, and transformed them into effective 
tools for organizing” their waves of protest (Akin, Encina, Restivo, Schwartz, & Tyagi, 
2012, p. 1). New Media opened the online public sphere to Arab women and made it easier, 
and in some cases, possible for them to participate in the uprisings without being seen as 
breaking any of their societies’ social codes. The list of Arab women using New Media to 
impact the uprisings is long and includes Arab young women who were at the forefront of 
the revolutions in their countries like Tunisia’s blogger Lina Ben Mhenni, Egypt’s Esraa 
Abdel Fattah, who became widely known as “Facebook girl,” Libya’s Danya Bashir, and 
Bahrain’s Zeinab and Maryam al-Khawaja. These young Arab women were among the 
online activists and included “Citizen journalists who became leading news sources for the 
protesters who took to the streets and the Cybersphere to demand that their entrenched 
leaders step down, and the citizens who paid the ultimate price, being beaten to death and 
murdered in those regimes’ desperate attempts to cling to power” (Radsch, 2012, para. 3).  
 The effective use of these New Media in the Arab uprisings seemed to have a global 
snowball effect that carried both the organizing methods and the vocabulary of protest in 
the Arab Spring to every region of the world. Young Arabs used social networking 
platforms Facebook and Twitter to mobilize people as never before. With Twitter, young 
revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain were able to organize their 
ranks/actions and quickly communicate news updates to their people who would not be 
able to get this information from their country’s state controlled media. Facebook remains 
one of the most central nodes in Egyptian networks of political information. Global media 
reporting during the uprisings and since have frequently asserted that youth-led social 
media played a major role in these uprisings. However, viewing the uprisings too narrowly 
in these terms overlooks the breadth and depth of the popular mobilization.  
 
The Use of Central Squares 
 
The other shared tactic used in various Arab Spring countries was the use of central squares 
in major cities: from Egypt’s Tahrir Square to Tunisia’s central Bourguiba Avenue to Pearl 
Square in Manama, and the University Quarter in Sanaa to the plazas of Syria’s ancient 
cities, public squares have been at the center of the Arab Spring. The centrality of these 
spaces to the narrative of the uprisings in the Arab world has largely been overshadowed 
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in the traditional media by the role that social networking played in fomenting rebellion. 
For all the praise that has been lavished upon the Arab world’s youthful revolutionaries, 
one must not forget the gray, old spaces where they massed. Says Vishaan Chakrabarti, a 
Columbia University professor of architecture who frequently writes about public spaces 
in the Middle East, “A tremendous amount of ink has been used for Facebook and Twitter. 
But it was just as important for people to have face-to-face contact in public squares to plan 
their next steps” (Sanburn, 2011, para. 2).  
 There are enough common features among the Arab uprisings in various Arab states 
to justify speaking of an “Arab Spring” or an “Arab Wave” of democratic uprisings. 
However, these uprisings are not monolithic, and the experiences of each Arab state within 
the Arab Spring has been distinct. Variations amongst the uprisings deserve attention from 
scholars and the unique origins and conclusions of each provide valuable insights that could 
benefit those seeking to understand why some of the uprisings resulted in swift change, 
while others have become protracted conflicts. For example, the military in some countries 
defected from the regime (Tunisia and Egypt) while part or all of the military in other 
countries has stayed, at least initially, loyal to the president (Libya, Yemen, and Syria). 
Some rebels have succeeded in liberating parts of cities (Tahrir Square in Cairo, Pearl 
Square in Manama, the University quarter in Sanaa), or in the case of Libya, whole 
segments of the population. The Syrian authorities, on the other hand, have prevented 
protesters from establishing any such sustaining or consistently thriving liberated enclaves. 
Likewise, while it would appear each popular uprising began as a strictly domestic affair, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia, intervened in Bahrain and 
NATO intervened in Libya (Willis, 2011).  
 
The Arab Spring: A Surprise? 
 
The initial international reaction to the Arab Spring was surprise. After all, these popular 
uprisings were happening in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria—places 
and people who had often been represented within Western democracies through 
Orientalist tropes—either indifferent to democracy or a threat to it. The fact that these 
citizens had opinions or the courage to act on them seemed surprising and in itself, 
revolutionary. Intrigue was added to the world’s surprise by the fact that the revolutionaries 
who created these uprisings made effective use of new communication and information 
technologies in countries that had been described as relatively slow to embrace new 
technologies. Even more surprising and remarkable was the breadth and depth of the Arab 
young women’s participation in the public sphere, be it online or on the street during the 
Arab Spring. In states where women traditionally played less of a role in the public sphere, 
these high levels of female participation were unexpected. 
 One of the reasons the Arab Spring seemed to take most communication and political 
science scholars, observers, and even intelligence communities around the world by 
surprise is the fact that Arab dictators and their regimes had remarkably avoided what 
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington called the “Third Wave of Democratization.” 
Beginning in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and extending to the historic 
democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s and Eastern Europe after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union at the end of the decade, this wave did not touch the Middle East in the 
same ways it influenced other regions of the world (Huntington, 1992). However, a new 
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Fourth Wave of global democratization may have begun with the Arab Spring. As Philip 
Howard et al. (2011) and his colleagues pointed out, by March 2011, the political impact 
of the early wave of the Arab Spring were significant: Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, two of the region’s strongest men, were deposed. Still, some 
Arab governments responded to the upheaval that had shaken the region in 2011 by trying 
to appease, and in some cases bribe, their subjects with material benefits including salary 
increases for both civilian and military employees, increases in food subsidies and 
unemployment benefits, and promises for measured political reforms. Notable among these 
governments were Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait. While these governments 
managed to, at least temporarily, keep social peace and avoid serious civil dissent, other 
Arab governments like Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain could not head off the uprisings. 
Immediately following the uprisings that toppled regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, protests 
began in Syria’s southern town of Daraa in mid-March after the arrest of schoolchildren 
who had scrawled anti-government graffiti. These protests quickly spread to other parts of 
the country, including the capital Damascus, as Bashar Assad’s regime cracked down, 
opening fire on demonstrators. Since then, the violence has escalated, as the opposition 
turned more to use of arms and the Alawite regime stepped up its retaliation with shelling 
of neighborhoods. Currently, Syria still functions in constant conflict, with the Islamic 
State controlling regions of the country, and the Assad regime fighting both against this 
group, and against other rebel factions. 
 Protests also erupted in Libya against Gaddafi and his dictatorial regime soon after 
pro-democracy uprisings succeeded in toppling the regimes in its neighboring countries to 
the west, Tunisia, and east, Egypt. Inspired by these uprisings, Libyan dissidents had 
planned a “day of rage” for Thursday, February 17, 2011. On February 15, security forces 
arrested Fathi Terbil, a prominent lawyer, who had represented families of some of the 
1,200 prisoners massacred by Libyan security forces at Abu Slim prison in 1996. Once 
released later that day, Terbil set up a webcam overlooking Benghazi’s main square, where 
some of the families had been protesting. With help from exiled Libyans in Canada and 
around the world, the video spread rapidly on the Internet (Mother Jones, 2011). In mid-
February 2011, Libyan dissident Najla Abdurrahman begged Western media to pay 
attention to the bloodbath unfolding in her country. She pointed out that if the Libyan 
protesters were ignored, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi, who showed no signs of 
concern over his reputation, internationally, would be able to silence opposition, cut off 
access from the international community, and continue in his position of power 
(Abdurrahman, 2011). While Gaddafi could not seal Libya off, the country was locked for 
months in a civil war that invited NATO intervention and ended with anti-government 
fighters closing in on Qaddafi’s final stronghold in Sirte and ultimately ending his regime 
and killing him on October 20, 2011.  
 
Roots of the Arab Spring 
 
A majority of academics, Arab-world area study experts, specialists, and media analysts 
also expressed surprise at the upheavals of the Arab Spring. The unpredicted events that 
were unfolding across the region raised not just the questions of what, who, and how of the 
Arab Spring, but also the big question of why now. Why had the Arab world that appeared 
so resistant to change, seemed to suddenly experience widespread demonstrations, 
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successful revolutions, socio-political movements, and desire for more fundamental 
political transformation? A comprehensive review of the literature available yielded a 
plethora of conditions that might have constituted the root causes of the Arab Spring. 
 
Freedom Deficit and Democracy Deficiency  
 
In the 20 years leading to the Arab Spring, the Arab world lagged behind the rest of the 
world on most if not all indices of freedom and democracy. Most Arab countries scored 
poorly on indices of freedom of expression including press and academic freedoms; 
freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion; freedom of association 
and civil society organizations; the rule of law, including independent judiciary, fair trials, 
and freedom from exile and/or torture; and personal social freedoms, including gender and 
minority equalities (Arafa, 2013, p. 107). The Arab world also lagged behind other regions 
of the world in granting political freedoms including electoral processes, political pluralism 
and participation, and government accountability, openness, and transparency.  
 Absence of press freedom in the Arab world has been attributed in part to “government 
ownership and control in some Arab countries; censorship and self-censorship in others; 
and legal restrictions in almost all countries of the region” (Arafa, 2013, p. 107). The close 
ties of the Arab press to government and politics in each country have led to lack of media 
independence and diversity.  
 In 2009, the year preceding the first Arab uprising in Tunisia, the Reporters Without 
Borders Press Freedom Index, which evaluated 175 countries on the basis of media 
freedom, ranked the majority of Arab countries at the bottom: Yemen 167, Syria 165, Saudi 
Arabia 163, Libya 156, Sudan 148, and Egypt 143 (Reporters Without Borders Press, 
2009). The report indicated that while national media systems in the Arab world were still 
lagging on the free press index in 2009, the region as a whole showed both overall 
improvements and some large gains in specific countries. However, the improved average 
regional score reflected the fact that in a number of countries, the media environment has 
benefited from greater access to satellite television service, pan-Arab press, and the 
Internet, including new formats such as blogs and social networking websites. In Arab 
countries like Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen independent media were still either 
nonexistent or barely functional. In those states the press frequently acted as a mouthpiece 
for the regime. Citizens’ access to unbiased information was severely limited, or dissent 
was crushed through imprisonment, torture, and other forms of repression (Freedom 
House, 2008, 2010). In this disparate conventional media environment, the new digital 
tools including mobile phones, internet connection, and social media provided dissident 
groups in various Arab counties with vital channels to bypass the government-controlled 
media, unwilling to print or air any news of civil unrest and opposition to the government.  
 As the Arab Human Development Report aptly pointed out, freedom to form 
associations in the Arab countries was restricted in varying degrees by law. Associations 
and civil society organizations in most Arab countries were subject to various forms of 
oversight and surveillance (United Nations Development Programme, 2004).  
 Popular political participation in governance in the Arab world was often completely 
absent or manipulated to keep it at a minimum. First, political parties in the Arab states 
were either outlawed or marginalized. Second, elections were either non-existent or 
manipulated into what Schedler (2006) calls an “Electoral Authoritarianism” tool. After 
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decades of single candidate referenda, multicandidate presidential elections were held in 
four Arab states: Algeria in 1995, Egypt in 2005, Tunisia in 2004, and Yemen in 2006. 
Instead of monopolizing the political arena through military or single-party dominance, the 
Arab autocratic leaders of these countries permitted their opponents to contest national 
elections but only after taking all “necessary measures” that assured them that these 
elections were not to be the “death of dictatorship” that Samuel Huntington (1992) 
envisioned. Elections in these four Arab countries proved to be effective survival strategies 
for preserving the regimes while maintaining the false image of a fair democratic process. 
 Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler (2008) explained that because of the persistence of 
authoritarianism across the Arab world, popular support for democracy in that part of the 
world was widespread. This claim is echoed with evidence by the World Values Survey, 
which indicated that popular support for democracy in the Arab world was as high as or 
higher than in any other world region (Tessler, 2011). While this might appear anomalous 
in a region where ordinary citizens have had little experience with democracy, the absence 
of democracy may be the very factor that led so many citizens to desire a democratic 
alternative to the political systems by which they were governed on the eve of the Arab 
Spring.  
 
Arab Rentier States 
 
As James Gelvin points out, one of the major agreed upon explanations of why 
authoritarianism, both social and political, has been so prevalent in the Arab world and 
constitutes one of the deep rooted causes of the Arab uprisings has to do with the state’s 
control over resources almost across the whole Arab world (Arafa, Auter, & Al-Jaber, 
2005). According to Gelvin, “States [governments] in the Arab world are highly dependent 
on a source of revenue called by economists ‘Rent’” (Gelvin, 2012, p. 7). Political scientists 
and economists refer to states that rely on income driven from sources other than taxation 
as “Rentier States” or “Allocation States.” These states derive most of their revenues from 
renting their resources to both foreign and domestic clients and distribute the rent they 
receive to local favorite groups. The term is most frequently applied to states rich in highly 
valued natural resources such as oil and natural gas, but also includes states rich in financial 
instruments such as a reserve currency and strong banking industry or having trading and 
re-export centers. It can also be applied to those states that trade on their strategic resources 
such as permitting the development of an important military base on their territories. 
Dependent as they are on this source of income, Rentier States may generate rents 
externally by manipulating the global political and economic environment. Such 
manipulation may include monopolies, trade restrictions, and the solicitation of subsidies 
or aid in exchange for political influence. Using a four-criteria scale to determine whether 
a state can be classified as a Rentier State or not, Egyptian economist Hazem El Beblawi 
(1990) classified nearly all Arab states as Rentier States.  
 Clearly, the nature of a Rentier State has the potential to foster or perpetuate 
authoritarianism. It enables the government to be the dominant economic actor, have 
monopoly on power, and function without relying on heavy taxation from its citizens for 
revenue. It facilitates the process by which a government may write a social contract 
between the state and the citizens that serves as “benefits for compliance” (Gelvin, 2012, 
p. 8). Several political scientists and political economists have suggested that a Rentier 
82 Journal of Global Initiatives 
State is often in a good position to gain long-term political acquiescence of its citizens. 
They have the ability to buy off their would-be domestic opponents through ties of 
patronage and lavishing economic benefits on potential opponents (Vandewalle, 1987; 
Beblawi, 1990).  
 Second, rent enables the state to provide services to citizens who are not paying taxes 
in return for these services, enabling the government to legitimize the reverse notion of no 
representation without taxation. Governments in Rentier States are not accountable to 
citizens in the same way governments who collect taxes may be. As Anderson (1987) 
noted, a country with sufficient non-tax revenues “may be virtually […] autonomous from 
its society, winning popular acquiescence through distribution rather than support through 
taxation and representation” (p. 10). Meanwhile, citizens in a Rentier State don’t face a 
citizenry that can demand accountability or transparency in exchange for taxation. 
 
Arab Police States  
 
A police state is one in which the government exercises rigid and repressive controls over 
the political, economic, and even social life of the population. Among the Arab countries 
that have been swept with waves of uprising so far, only Egypt and Bahrain were not run 
totally as police states. Syria has been a notable example of a state where clear elements of 
totalitarianism and social control are normalized. The secret police in most Arab states was 
pervasive and intelligence agents—Al Mukhabarat- were employed at every level of 
society in order to spread fear and silence amongst any emerging opposition. Writes Arafa 
(2013), “these secret police and intelligence agents operated either outside of the law or in 
its shadowy areas. There was little or no distinction between the law and the exercise of 
political power by the executive branch of government. In the absence of the rule of law, 
human rights were violated and/or unevenly enforced” (p. 116).  
 
Endless Emergency through Emergency Laws  
 
For decades, several Arab countries have been governed by emergency powers and other 
exceptional measures by invoking emergency laws even in times of peace. Under 
emergency laws, police powers were extended, constitutional rights were suspended, 
censorship was legalized, and due process was often abolished. Emergency laws also 
limited non-governmental political activity, including street demonstrations, unapproved 
political organizations and unregistered financial donations. They permitted indefinite 
detention without trial, hearings of civilians by military courts, prohibited gatherings of 
more than five people, and limited speech and association. The suspension of the normal 
due process in the name of restoring or preserving national security and national welfare 
in several Arab countries helped transfer power to the ruler and allowed the government to 
arrest dissenters without due process. In most Arab countries that invoked emergency laws 
in time of peace, and a journalist who criticized the ruler or his policies could find 
him/herself behind bars, denied due process, and tried in a security or military court often 
reserved for cases of treason or espionage. Emergency law is typically a temporary measure 
and ceases when emergencies subside. In some Arab Spring countries, emergency laws 
dragged on for decades. In Syria, an emergency law has been in effect since the Ba’ath 
coup d’état of 1963, over 52 years. In Egypt, emergency legislation that was drafted after 
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President Sadat’s assassination lasted all 30 years of the Mubarak era. Algeria’s emergency 
law has been in place since 1992. Meanwhile, regimes in Bahrain and Yemen declared a 
state of emergency at the height of the uprising in order to maintain power. 
 
Cronyism and Corruption in “Soft Arab States” 
 
In the three decades preceding the Arab Spring, many Arab countries were plagued with 
several forms of corruption from bribery, cronyism, and nepotism to graft, extortion, and 
embezzlement. In Egypt on Mubarak’s watch, in Tunisia’s Ben Ali regime, and in Syria 
with Bashar Al-Assad, corruption became a way of life, and privilege and cronyism 
occurred at the expense of competition. These states could be easily described by the term 
“Soft States” as coined by the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1968). In Myrdal’s Soft 
States there is corruption fostered by all types of social indiscipline. Myrdal (1968) states, 
“These social indisciplines manifest themselves in deficiencies in legislation and, in 
particular, law observance and enforcement; a widespread disobedience by public officials, 
and, often, their collusion with powerful persons and groups ... whose conduct they should 
regulate” (p. 208). The Arab states have fit Myrdal’s description of “Soft States” that are 
“Dominated by powerful interests that exploit the power of the State or government to 
serve their own interests rather than the interests of their citizens. Policies decided on are 
often not enforced, if they are enacted at all. Authorities in these states, even when framing 
policies, are reluctant to place obligations on people” (p. 277).  
 At a high level, numerous loans were granted without collateral by state banks to a 
selected group of elite who have or were associated with seats of power, many of whom 
vanished without making payments. At lower and middle levels, population growth and 
unemployment led many to break the law to avoid poverty in the slums of Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Syria. Bribes in varying amounts were expected of citizens and over time, were often 
factored into one’s monthly salary. Corruption from the top in these Arab countries 
generated difficult economic conditions that caused increasingly strong popular 
resentment, while the regimes used national security and terrorism as an excuse to continue 
using their emergency laws to crackdown on opposition (Gawhry, 2012).  
 On a more macroeconomic level, these authoritarian rulers applied neoliberal policies 
without much consideration for their negative impact on large segments of their 
populations, and in the process, enriched themselves and their political allies through a 
corruption-ridden process of privatization of public sector enterprises. These privatization 
schemes led to crony capitalism and the formation of oligarchic business networks 
controlled by ruling elites (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Former Egyptian National 
Democratic Party (Mubarak’s ruling party) leader Ahmed Ezz, who monopolized the steel 
industry in Egypt, was one of the major symbols of regime-sponsored corruption. Ezz was 
also widely known as the architect of fraud in the 2010 legislative election in Egypt. In 
Tunisia, relatives and close associates of President Zine Abidine Ben Ali and his wife, 
Leila Trabelsi, like Marouane Mabrouk, the husband of Ben Ali’s daughter Syrine and Bel 
Hassan Trabelsi, the President’s brother-in-law, had unfair advantages in securing business 
partnerships with foreign investment companies. Symbols of this crony capitalism were 
widespread in the Arab world, and included Rami Makhlouf in Syria, sons of Muammar 
Gaddafi in Libya, and the brothers of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. 
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Huge Youth Bulge: The Arab “Global Generation” 
 
Several scholars (Nelson, 2012; Zhuo, Wellman, & Yu, 2011) concluded that the groups 
that were directly responsible for igniting and sustaining the uprisings in the Arab world 
were those age groups that have been dubbed the “Global Generation” by Adeel A. Shah 
and Sheheryar T. Sardar. This Global Generation consists of over half the world’s 
population and is made up of young people born post-1980. (Shah and Sardar, 2011). This 
generation grew up in the digital age that allowed individuals in various geographic 
locations to experience the same events virtually in real time. In addition, members of this 
generation who are internet savvy can access vast amounts of information almost instantly 
and, in turn, depend on that ability for daily functioning. Shah and Sardar (2011) concluded 
that the Global Generation not only communicates across borders, it displays emotions 
across borders, creating deeper connections and striving to understand who would 
otherwise be the “other” (2011). 
 According to Henrik Urdal, the Arab world has one of the highest proportions in the 
world of young people among the general population. This phenomenon in demographic 
terms is sometimes described as a youth bulge, that is, the age group (or cohort) of youth 
is far more numerous than for all other age groups combined. Arab states with high 
proportions of youth under age 24 include Yemen at 65.3%, Saudi Arabia at 62.3%, Iraq 
at 61.7%, and Algeria at 56.5%.  
 From Tunisia to Egypt, and Bahrain to Libya, Yemen, and Syria, youth have been the 
face of dissent against longstanding autocratic regimes in the Arab world. The region is 
facing a demographic bulge in which youth aged 15 to 29 comprise the largest proportion 
of the population. While youth bulges around the world are described as either challenges 
or opportunities, they present huge challenges in the Arab world. In other parts of the world, 
the youth bulge phenomenon has been an opportunity. In East Asia and some parts of 
Southeast Asia, open economies and strong educational systems are turning youth bulges 
into opportunities. In contrast, youth bulges in most Arab countries are proving to be huge 
challenges because of their governments’ inability to put together economic policies that 
make use of these human resources. These young people, frustrated with lack of jobs, have 
been at the forefront of anti-government protests and other forms of contentious politics. 
 Unemployment rates in the Arab world were among the highest globally on the eve of 
the Arab Spring. Despite high economic growth rates in the region as a whole during the 
oil boom from 2002 until 2010, unempolyment among Arabs remained in the double digit 
category (Kadr, 2012). While unemployment across all age groups is relatively high, it is 
almost four times as high for young people compared to other demographic groups. The 
Arab world has the highest regional rates of youth joblessness in the world (Knickmeyer, 
2011), 3.7 times the rates for adults, as compared to 2.7 times the rates for adults 
worldwide, suggesting that young people in the Arab region suffer from a considerable 
amount of economic marginalization and exclusion. The problem is region-wide; Qatar is 
the only Arab country with available data in which youth unemployment rates were lower 
than the world average -11% among Qatari nationals (Kabbani, 2011).  
 
  
Mohamed Arafa and Crystal Armstrong 85 
Heavy Investment in Defense and Low Investment in Citizen’s Economic 
Future  
 
In the years leading to the Arab Spring, most Arab countries invested heavily in defense at 
the expense of much needed infrastructure investment, improving education and training, 
widening and diversifying their economic bases, and creating jobs. Most Arab leaders 
directed the wealth and power of their states towards consolidating their own power and 
preserving it through their armed forces and national/republican guards. As a result, 
military spending as a share (percentage) of state gross domestic product (GDP) in the Arab 
world as a whole was (4.8%) higher in 2010, the year before the Arab uprisings, than that 
in any other region of the world, according to Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (2012). However, a note of caution is due here. Much of the military spending of 
the Gulf Arab states is intended to keep the balance of power in the region from titling 
towards Iran, which spends around $9.3-9.5 billion annually, and to close the gap with 
Israel which spends 6.5 of its GDP, $15.1-16.2 billion a year. This level of expenditure 
places these two non-Arab countries in the top five defense spenders in the Middle East: 
Israel second behind Saudi Arabia and Iran third, followed by Iraq and the United Arab 
Emirates. While huge military spending takes a toll on the budgets of all countries of the 
Middle East, this burden is somewhat mitigated in the case of Israel since the United States 
is believed to pay approximately 18% of Israel’s military budget (Weinsteinm 2011).  
 
Arab Media Revolution and the New Arab Public Sphere 
 
While the uprisings in various Arab countries in 2011 appeared to take the world by 
surprise, there had been another revolution brewing in these countries for at least two 
decades that did not escape the world’s attention. It is the “Arab Media Revolution.” It 
began with the arrival of satellite Arab news TV/networks two decades ago. That 
revolution “helped shape a new Arab public sphere where discussion and exchange of 
opinion became the norm” in the Arab world (Noueihed & Warren, 2012, p. 53). Although 
not yet systematically examined or studied with any level of regularity, there seems to be 
some link between the current Arab revolutions collectively known as the Arab Spring and 
the Arab media revolution launched over 20 years ago. Some may even argue that the Arab 
Spring is partly the result of the Arab media revolution that has been eroding the Arab 
regimes’ control over the flow of information among their populations. The Arab media 
revolution is believed to have begun with the launch of the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera TV on 
November 1, 1996.  
 Al-Jazeera TV was the first satellite television service to emanate from an Arab 
country and still manage to keep its independence from the government of that country. 
Although Al-Jazeera is still owned and mostly funded by the government of Qatar, it is 
independently run by professionals, not by government bureaucrats like other state run 
media in the region (Auter, Arafa & Al-Jaber, 2003). Qatar’s government has very little 
influence over Al-Jazeera’s editorial policies.  
 Al-Jazeera has introduced a whole range of new styles of television news to Arab TV 
and Arab viewers. For example, the satellite channel airs an in-depth analytical late evening 
news program that targets an educated audience with a deep interest in Middle Eastern and 
international affairs. This news program combines news with extended live reports and 
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interviews with both newsmakers and specialists. Earlier in primetime, Al-Jazeera airs a 
news program that covers the main events in the Middle East and the world in a serious, 
but still more accessible style for a more general Arab audience. This news format was new 
to both Arab news people and Arab TV viewers alike.  
 To explain how different Al-Jazeera’s news presentations and programming were from 
what Arab TV has been practicing, this news channel based in Qatar can be compared to 
Qatar government-owned and run TV. Qatar Television functions as a government organ 
whose main purpose is to deliver official newscasts in a format that includes a long lineup 
of either very long items dealing with Qatari leadership news, or very short items dealing 
with regional and international developments (Al-Jaber, 2002). Television reports are 
hardly used on Qatar TV because newscasts rely on studio delivery with government 
control limiting and muting news and program contents (Arafa, 1992). Al-Jazeera, on the 
other hand, operates as a Western-styled news organization that delivers a 24-hour service 
of high quality television journalism. Its news bulletins include on-the-spot reports by Arab 
professional correspondents from the major Arab, Islamic, and world news capitals (Arafa, 
Auter & Al-Jaber, 2005).  
 In 1996, Orbit TV introduced Arab viewers to TV talk shows that allowed viewers’ 
participation in discussing political, social, and cultural issues previously considered 
taboos in the Arab World. Al-Jazeera TV, however, has been credited not only with making 
it possible to talk about many unpleasant, but necessary subjects and issues in Arab 
societies, but also with familiarizing Arab viewers with plain language in the public 
discussion of many topics. In the absence of effective civic societies in a large swath of the 
Arab World, with its talk shows and public affairs programs, Al-Jazeera provides Arab 
citizens with an opportunity to engage in political discourse on television, as most are 
unable to engage directly with their governments.  
 From its inception, Al-Jazeera TV has targeted a pan-Arab audience, an orientation 
that explains its focus on regional and international coverage and its reluctance to air 
domestic news about crime, health, and education from its own home base of Qatar or any 
other Arab society. Its increasingly rising popularity—its reach is currently estimated at 45 
million viewers including 150,000 in the United States (Auter, Arafa, & Al-Jaber, 2002)—
is an indication that Arab viewers are indeed hungry for Middle Eastern and international 
news and that narrow domestic news coverage may not be necessary for media success. A 
clear example of the prime consequences of the Al-Jazeera’s pan-Arab orientation is its 
coverage of the Second Palestinian Intifada. Al-Jazeera’s focus on the cycle of suicide 
attacks by the Palestinians and the Israeli counter-violence has forced the issue into the 
Arab living room and elevated the Palestinian problem to heights not seen since the Six 
Day War of 1967.  
 Al- Jazeera has been noted for setting in motion the emergence of modern TV 
journalism in the Arab world (Arafa, Auter, & Al-Jaber, 2005). It has helped create and 
open up an Arab public sphere by making live debate, talk shows, and news programs 
featuring interviews with exiled Arab opposition leaders and debates on touchy subjects a 
norm in Arab satellite TV. It has been instrumental in breaking much of the Arab media 
taboo on discussing sensitive and critical issues like Islamic fundamentalism, democracy 
in the Arab World (or its absence), American influence on some Arab governments, human 
rights abuses, and polygamy.  
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New Media in the Arab World 
 
Seeking an operational definition of the New Media, these authors adopt cultural historian 
Lisa Gitelman’s view of media as both technologies that enable communication and sets 
of associated “protocols” or social and cultural practices that grow around these 
technologies (Jenkins, 2006, p. 13). Thus, the New Media we refer to here are not just 
technologies that function as delivery systems. They are also cultural systems. 
 The term “New Media” in this piece of research broadly refers to all interactive forms 
of communication that use both the first and second generations of Internet technologies—
often collectively called New Media 1.0 and New Media 2.0. While New Media 1.0 
includes e-mails, chat rooms, list-serves, search engines, and forums, New Media 2.0 
includes the second generation of increasingly wireless Internet-related technologies that 
combine words and images on laptops, podcasts, iPhones, Blackberries, social networking 
platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Myspace, WordPress, Kik, WhatsApp and 
Meetup, RSS feeds, text messaging, blogs, wikis, and virtual worlds. The traits of the New 
Media, the second generation in particular, have made user-generated content an integral 
part of the online communication process. They make it possible for users to create and 
modify content and share it with others, using relatively simple tools that are often 
inexpensive or free. 
 While Arab satellite TV, and satellite news networks in particular, were going through 
a technical and programming revolution that helped it enter the era of modern independent 
TV journalism in the 1990s and 2000s, most Arab countries were making noteworthy 
progress in acquiring pivotal elements of the information and communication technologies 
(ICT) made available by the global Information and Communication Revolution. 
 Interestingly, the first link to the Internet in the Arab world took place in Tunisia in 
1991, a country that also happened to host the first successful Arab Spring revolution. 
Kuwait was the second Arab country to start Internet services in 1992 as a part of its 
reconstruction after its liberation from the Iraqi invasion forces. In 1993, Egypt, and the 
United Arab Emirates established links to the Internet (Abdulla, 2007). Jordan linked to 
the Internet in 1994 (Wheeler, 2004). Qatar, which is the second most Internet-connected 
country in the Arab world today behind the United Arab Emirates with a penetration rate 
of 82% (Media Middle East, 2011), started its Internet service in May 1996 through Q-Tel, 
Qatar’s telecommunication corporation. Syria and Saudi Arabia were the slowest states in 
the region to allow public access to the Internet with regular access not becoming available 
until the late 1990s. In Syria, for example, even as late as 1997 there were only two places 
with Internet access—the American Cultural Center and the Syrian Engineers’ 
Association—both located in Damascus. When Bashar Al-Assad became president of 
Syria, Internet access became more readily available. Before then, many Syrians obtained 
Internet access via long distance phone calls to Internet Service Providers (ISP) in Lebanon 
and Jordan. These same practices of long distance remote access to the Internet (via 
Bahrain) were also common in Saudi Arabia, before the state made access to the Internet 
available through locally licensed ISPs. Once Internet access was made officially available 
in the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia witnessed the largest and fastest growth in Internet user 
population of any Arab country.  
 There was noticeable disparity in the Arab countries’ performance in their attempts to 
access these technologies. However, as the United Nations Development Programme 
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(2012) Arab Knowledge Report 2010-2011 noted, “In 2008, 17 Arab States recorded levels 
of development in technological performance exceeding those observed in all other regions 
of the world. Four Arab countries have been listed among the top fifty most ready to utilize 
ICT, all of them Gulf Cooperation Council” states (p. 143). The World Bank’s ICT index 
(2012), which is based on progress in acquisition of telephone lines, computers, and the 
Internet and measures a country’s capacity to facilitate the effective creation, 
dissemination, and processing of information, shows that in 2008, 11 Arab countries 
witnessed a substantial rise in their score on the ICT index in comparison with 1995.  
 While the global number of Internet users in the year leading to the Arab Spring (2010) 
was estimated at little over 2 billion, a survey of 16 out of 22 Arab countries estimated that 
number at 45-50 million in late 2009. The Arab Knowledge Report (2009) placed the 
number of Arabic-speaking Internet users in the entire Arab world at 60 million. However, 
Internet World Stats (2012), which provides data on world population and world 
telecommunications information including Internet usage put the number of Internet users 
in the Arab world in December 2011, at close to 87 million among a total population of 
little over 310 million Arabs, with a population penetration of 35.6%. 
 One of the ironies of the effective use of the New Media in the Egyptian uprising 
specifically was the fact that substantial access to New Media among primarily young 
Egyptians was available largely because of the Mubarak government’s efforts to expand 
information technology capabilities as a tool for socioeconomic development (Hamdy, 
2009). Beginning in 1999, government initiatives included free Internet access, low-cost 
computers, and the expansion of Internet access centers. According to Internet marketing 
research firm Internet World Stats, in February 2010, more than 21% of Egypt’s population 
of 80 million had access to the Internet, and more than 4.5 million used Facebook (Internet 
World Stats, 2012). Additionally, more than 70% of the population had a mobile phone 
subscription (Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology, 2010). 
 
The Complex Relationship between New Media and the Arab Spring 
 
The fact that most Arab revolutionaries have mastered and successfully used the available 
two generations of Internet technologies does not necessarily mean that these technologies 
have made these users more democratically inclined. Democratic inclinations, as Jon 
Anderson and Michael Hudson (2008) of the Arab Information Project at Georgetown 
University pointed out, “Are randomly distributed among Internet actors: there are Internet 
Authoritarians as well as Internet Libertarians in these—indeed, in all—[Arab] societies. 
Visions of internet liberation are just that, visions, and not well-grounded theories” (para. 
5).  
 Some analysts and observers in the global media have claimed that the narrative in 
Arab media, both traditional and New Media, regarding the Tunisian street vender 
Mohamed Bouazizi setting himself on fire on December 17, 2010, was the first trigger not 
just for the Tunisian revolution. Uprisings in neighboring Egypt, as well as the domino 
effect that followed throughout the Arab world, are often traced back to this singular event. 
However, another New Media narrative had been developing in Egypt, and with it a protest 
movement had been growing and gathering momentum. That narrative flowed from the 
“We Are All Khaled Saeed” story.  
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 The death of Khaled Saeed, a 28 year-old Egyptian blogger who accidentally revealed 
the corruption of Alexandria police in a video he had taken in 2010 and later shared online 
might have been a contributing catalyst of the Egyptian uprising. In the video that Khaled 
Saeed posted online was a group of Alexandria police officers sharing confiscated drugs 
among themselves. Once the Alexandria police learned of the online video, they sent two 
plainclothes officers who pulled Khaled Saeed from an Internet cafe in Alexandria in June 
2010 and beat him to death in the lobby of a residential building. Human rights advocates 
worldwide claimed that Khaled was killed because he exposed evidence of police 
corruption.  
 The Egyptian police and security services have a reputation for brutality and snuffing 
out political opposition. Within five days of Khaled Saeed’s death, an anonymous online 
activist, whose identity was later revealed as Wael Ghoneim, a Dubai-based Google 
marketing director, created a page titled “We Are All Khaled Saeed” On the page, he posted 
cellphone photos from the morgue of Khaled’s battered and bloody face, and YouTube 
videos playing up contrasting pictures of him happy and smiling beside the graphic images 
from the morgue. By mid-June, 2010, 130,000 people joined the page to view and share 
updates about the case. Khalid Saeed’s death and the posting of his deformed face and 
bashed head photos and videos online were probably “the starkest example yet of the 
special power of social networking tools like Facebook even- or especially- in a police 
state” (Preston, 2011, para. 8).  
 The Facebook page set up around the death of Khaled Saeed by Wael Ghoneim offered 
Egyptians a rare forum to bond over their outrage about government corruption and abuses. 
As the name that Ghoneim gave to that Facebook page, it told these young Arabs that the 
same atrocity could happen to them if they did not demand change and actively work for 
it. This Facebook page achieved at least two goals for a nascent change movement in Egypt. 
 
Alternative Media Momentum 
 
The Khaled Saeed movement provided an alternative media pathway to information and 
collaboration. The government media had claimed Khaled Saeed choked to death on a 
packet of drugs. The digital images of Khaled on the Facebook page showed that his face 
had clearly been struck repeatedly and that the official drug story could not be trusted. 
These images were quickly shared by hundreds of thousands of mobile phone users and 
1.8 million members of the Facebook page that carried his name. This alternative medium 
presented young Egyptians, along with other Arab followers, with a platform where they 
could not just get the facts about a case of police brutality and corruption, but also express 
their outrage. The movement offered an alternative forum for citizens and reinforced 
beliefs that traditional media were nothing more than propaganda mouthpieces for the 
government.  
 
Political Becomes Personal 
 
This Facebook page turned political events into personal experiences by turning the face 
of Khaled Saeed into the face of a revolt against corruption and injustice in Egypt, and 
around the Arab world. Information about Khaled on Facebook gave citizens information 
about the person who experienced brutality. When the political becomes personal, the level 
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of engagement, both emotional and physical, can increase, and with this participation may 
grow as well. After Khaled’s death, standing up to Mubarak’s regime became more than 
political conversation. Khaled put a human face on the urgency of standing up to 
corruption, while providing important news, tools, and resources for anyone looking to stay 
at the forefront of advocacy for change. Millions of Egyptians and other Arabs found 
alternatives to the government controlled media that were widely considered biased in their 
selection and framing of news and information. While sources of alternative media also 
often represented biased perspectives, they provided “alternative” viewpoints, different 
information, and additional interpretations of events that were absent in the government-
controlled media (Preston, 2011). 
 
Dissecting Social Media’s Contribution to the Arab Spring 
 
Regardless of whether the Tunisian Bouazizi narrative, the Egyptian Khaled Saeed 
narrative, or some other force or combination of events can be credited with triggering the 
Arab Spring, there has been a growing body of research on how the new information and 
communication technologies we collectively call New Media have become a viable 
alternative to traditional media. The use of these tools in social movements and contentious 
politics in the Arab world has become a focus of both the international media-scape, and 
academics worldwide. However, evidence of the effective use of New Media for planning, 
mobilizing, organizing, and implementing collective action is still more descriptive than 
empirical (Lievrouw, 2012). The challenges that scholars face in disaggregating causes and 
correlations between social media activism and physical political events will likely 
continue to challenge scholars. 
 Langman (2005) argues that computer-savvy activists use the Internet to initiate and 
organize a wide variety of civil disobedience actions, including occupying public places, 
sit-ins, and mass demonstrations. Numerous scholars have pointed to the new 
communication technologies—particularly social media like short messaging services, 
social-networking sites, and blogs—as being, collectively, an important new resource for 
the successful organization and implementation of social movements (Della Porta & 
Mosca, 2005; Langman, 2005; O’Lear, 1999). Social networking platforms have been used 
in organizing and implementing collective activities, promoting a sense of community and 
collective identity among dissatisfied youth groups, creating less-confined political spaces, 
establishing connections with other activist groups, and publicizing their grievances, 
causes, and demands to gain support from the regional and global communities. As an 
anonymous Egyptian activist tweeted on January 25, 2011, the first “Day of Anger” and 
the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution, young Egyptians used “Facebook to schedule 
the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world” (Paul & Zlutnick, 2012, 
para 3).  
 The Arab Spring has certainly brought many claims on how important a mechanism 
for organization of protests and collective action in the various Arab uprisings the New 
Media have been. It has produced even more euphoric claims about the contributions of 
these media to the democratization movements in the Arab world. However, systematic 
research that effectively measures the causal effects of these media has been challenging 
for academics to produce. Limitations on methodologically sound research typically center 
on various intervening factors that may have contributed to the evolution of the various 
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Arab uprisings. Akin and his associates (Akin, Encina, Restivo, Schwartz, & Tyagi, 2012) 
argue that the successful use of new technologies by Tunisian and Egyptian protestors 
marked the birth of an emerging repertoire of social protest that was liberating, increased 
transparency and participation (both local and global), was almost instantaneous, 
circumvented both conventional and government controlled media sources, and facilitated 
collective action and non-hierarchical organization and decision-making.  
 Interviews with several young Egyptian “Digerati” (Arafa, personal interviews, April 
17 and 18, 2011) seem to support the assumption that Arab youth appeared to grasp this 
repertoire. They understood the decentralized character of the Internet and its ability (along 
with mobile-phone networks) to reach large numbers of people very quickly. When 
Facebook and Twitter began to be monitored by security forces, traditional leaflets advised 
recipients to redistribute instructions by email and photocopy instead of through social 
media (Black, 2011). On Thursday, January 27, 2011, Egyptians were urged in anonymous 
leaflet circulating in Cairo to come out after Friday prayers and demand the overthrow of 
Hosni Mubarak’s government, along with a demand for freedom, justice, and a democratic 
system. The leaflet provided practical and tactical advice for mass demonstrations and 
confronting riot police. The document called on protesters to begin with peaceful protests, 
carrying roses but no banners, and marching on official buildings while persuading police 
and soldiers to join their ranks. Since the beginning of the uprisings, news media and 
academics alike have postulated on the impact New Media may have on the success of the 
revolutions occurring across the Middle East and North Africa. While some insisted that 
these technologies were fueling revolution, others insisted that social media impact was 
being greatly overstated. These two camps are appropriately described by Sean Aday and 
his research team at the U.S. Institute of Peace as the “Cyberenthusiasts and Cyberskeptics” 
(Aday, Farrekll, Lynch, Sides, & Freelon, 2012, p. 4). Cyberenthusiasts led by Philip 
Howard and his associates at the Project on Information Technology and Political Islam 
(PITPI) at the University of Washington argue the New Media—Internet, mobiles, and 
social networking platforms—“Made the difference. Using these technologies, people 
interested in democracy could build extensive networks, create social capital, and organize 
political action with a speed and on a scale never seen before. Thanks to these technologies, 
virtual networks materialized in the streets. Digital media became the tool that allowed 
social movements to reach once-unachievable goals” (Aday et al., 2012, p. 4).  
 At the opposite end, Cyberskeptics including Malcolm Gladwell argue instead that the 
[Arab] revolutions were driven primarily by traditional forms of political organization and 
motivated by familiar grievances. Revolutions and protests, they argued, have happened 
for centuries without being updated in real-time on Twitter (Howard et al., 2011). Middle 
East scholar Joel Beinin has calculated that prior to the revolution beginning January 25th, 
there had been approximately 3,000 worker-led protests in Egypt over the first decade of 




Despite the deluge of reports on the association of the use of the New Media and the course 
of the individual Arab uprisings and the hoped for Springtime of Arab nations, little 
empirical research has been done so far on the topic. Furthermore, the little empirical 
research that has been achieved is yet to accurately measure the positive or negative effects 
92 Journal of Global Initiatives 
of the New Media on the success or failure of various Arab uprising. Recent work has 
proved promising, and yet many challenges remain for those wishing to study the role of 
new media in such revolutions. A brief overview of some noteworthy studies on the role 
of new media in the Arab Spring are provided below, along with an analysis of the 
remaining gaps. Finally, suggestions are offered for steps that may be taken in future 
research endeavors seeking to explore the connection between new media, digital 
technology, and revolution. 
 
Notable New Media Research on the Arab Spring 
 
Big Data Analysis 
 
One of the earliest empirical research projects on the topic is that of Philip Howard and his 
associates (2011) at the Project on Information Technology and Political Islam (PITPI) of 
the University of Washington, Seattle. Both the scope of the PITPI study and its 
methodology warrant a detailed description in our review of the empirical evidence 
available today on the impact of New Media during the Arab Spring.  
 In order to examine the role social media played during the Arab Spring, the PITPI 
research team created a Twitter dataset using the Twitter archiving service TwapperKeeper 
to capture the flow of tweets from the Twitter Search API for five Arab countries: Algeria, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Yemen. They analyzed the Twitter feeds for six hashtags 
beginning on January 14, 2011 and ending on March 24, 2012 for a total of 3,142,621 
tweets with over 75% (2,363,139) of that total from Egypt.  
 While previous studies focused on examining the flow of text messages within a single 
community, society, or country, the PITPI research project attempted to analyze a broader 
regional flow of text messages. The team examined tweet content, rather than simply 
twitter users, because the tweets represent a discourse and active dialogue about freedom 
that transcended national boundaries. The research team also distinguished between 
domestic, regional, and international contributors, which was an arduous task because the 
hashtag archives included several fields such as the Tweet’s author’s name, the GMT time 
it was posted, and the application used to send it, among other information, but did not 
include the authors’ self-reported location. To gather data on the location, the research team 
created a list of unique users from each hashtag via a custom PHP script. Each list was then 
used as an input into a second PHP script which automatically saved each user’s location 
field from the Twitter REST API. They then classified location fields into four categories: 
(1) within the hashtag country; (2) within the broader Arab region; (3) outside both the 
country and the Arab region; and (4) no provided location (Howard et al., 2011, p. 26). 
 The analysis of these “unique” datasets provided the research team with enough 
information to construct profiles for the roles of various social media platforms in several 
Arab uprisings. These role profiles were used to draw conclusions about certain cases under 
study. Using the profile of blogs in Tunisia, for example, the research team concluded that 
the “Tunisian blogosphere provided space for open political dialogue about regime 
corruption and the potential for political change” (Howard & Hussain, 2013, p. 51). The 
analysis of the 3 million-plus tweets yielded the conclusion that Twitter relayed stories of 
successful mobilization within and between countries, and, Facebook functioned as a 
central node in networks of political discontent in Egypt. During the protests, “YouTube 
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and other video archiving centers allowed citizen journalists, using mobile phone cameras 
and consumer electronics, to broadcast stories that the mainstream media could not or did 
not want to cover” (Howard & Hussain, 2013, p. 51). 
 Howard and his colleagues (2011) concluded that these New Media played a crucial 
role in the political uprising in Tunisia and Egypt by playing three specific roles. First, New 
Media provided a forum for the shaping of political debates about the Arab Spring. 
Participation in these forums was safer, faster, and removed distance barriers that would 
normally impede on traditional debates. Next, New Media inundated the online public 
sphere with revolutionary conversations, thus paving the road for major revolutionary and 
political events to take place. The research team depicted a spike in online revolutionary 
conversations that often preceded major events on the ground. Finally, New Media 
facilitated the dissemination of democratic ideas across borders in the Arab world and 
beyond (Howard et al., 2011). 
 
Case Study Assessment 
 
In an empirical study of a more narrow scope, Lilas Gawhry (2012) focused on the New 
Media’s role in the January 25th Egyptian revolution. In her attempt to answer her thesis’ 
research question of how social media influenced the creation and mobilization of social 
movements against an authoritarian regime, as observed during the revolution, Gawhry 
used the case study method to conduct an in-depth analysis of social networking platforms. 
In the study, Gawhry collected data from conventional newspapers, and New Media 
platforms including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, blogs, etc., in both English and Arabic. 
In addition to this set of empirical data, she did a secondary analysis of the available 
literature on the use of non-conventional media in the Arab world and interviewed several 
media scholars, political scientists, and subject matter experts. Gawhry’s research showed 
that social media were vital tools that enabled preexisting networks to override state 




In a study by McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, and Bliuc (2014), the authors posit that new 
media facilitates the development and sustainability of shared social identities. By tracing 
the dissemination of YouTube videos of Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia, and the 
Sidi Bouziz protest videos in Egypt, they illustrate how identity-based, networked content 
connected citizens at rates up to 10 times greater than similar non-networked content 
(McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliuc, 2014, pp. 734-735). Similarly, they traced the 
frequency and intensity of nationalist-based identity materials within social media 
platforms. Flags, for instance, increased in appearance within social media platforms as 
protest movements gained momentum or succeeded in overthrow (McGarty, et al., 2014). 
While this study does not provide a direct path toward weighting the impact of social media 
in the uprisings, it does show that in Tunisia and Egypt at least, social media platforms 
functioned to unite citizens both through shared social identities as dissenting citizens, and 
through the digital expression of their shared national pride. 
 
Networking Analysis 
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Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess (2013) took a more technical approach to their examination 
of social media platform functions during the Arab uprisings. They looked specifically at 
hashtags related to the revolution in Egypt, and the civil war occurring in Libya. Their 
analysis included both English and Arabic speaking users, along with users who utilized 
both languages. They examined original tweets, retweets, and @replies. They captured 
7.48 million tweets for #Egypt and found that initial interest in the subject included both 
English and Arabic users from across the globe. As the revolution subsided into rebuilding, 
however, they hashtag became much more localized and used in Arabic-speaking 
communities (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013, p. 880).  
 For #Libya, the authors captured 5.27 million tweets (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 
2013, p. 883), with a much lower (19%) average of tweets being sent in Arabic. They also 
noted that restrictions on Internet access by the Gaddhafi regime might have accounted for 
this, as the percentage of Arabic tweets rose rapidly after his downfall. Perhaps most 
noteworthy, is their conclusion that “Discussion under the #Libya hashtag is likely to 
consist largely of outsiders looking in, rather than—as in #Egypt—of locals and expatriates 
discussing the unfolding political crisis in their country” (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 
2013, p. 895). This methodological approach could easily be utilized in future protest 
movements to measure both utilization and the comparative potential impact of social 
media platforms like Twitter in multiple regions or countries.  
 
Challenges to New Media Research 
 
These examples serve to highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of existing research 
on social media, digital technology, and the impacts each has had on political movements, 
contentious politics, protest organization, and revolution. While the Arab Spring is only 
one example of recent history where academics have sought to explore these issues, it is 
also an ideal example because it occurred at a time when connectivity reached levels where 
impact could be measured more effectively, and social networking platforms were being 
utilized to much larger degrees than seen previously. As with any new technology, 
however, there is a catchup game to play and early scholars have had to learn via 
experience, modifying and improving on methodology as they work. As a result, initial 
findings and projects have faced sharp criticism. Nonetheless, many mainstream media 
outlets have attributed the success of uprisings in various Arab Spring states to the use of 
these platforms.  
 Such unsupported media claims without empirical evidence are dangerous, yet tend to 
accompany any new technology, whether evidence supports such claims or not. As we 
moved beyond the Arab Spring and into additional movements such as the EuroMaidan 
protests in Ukraine in 2013 or the Hong Kong protests through the fall and winter of 2014, 
methodology for examining social media’s impact improved. Newer projects have assisted 
in connecting social media information dissemination to protest turnout in Maidan Square 
in Kiev (Onuch, 2014). They have mapped the use of alternative mesh networks and 
anonymous texting applications for protection from a prying Chinese government in Hong 
Kong (Lepp, 2015). Even domestic research on the hashtag #Ferguson has sharpened 
sentiment analysis methods on social media platforms (LeFebrve & Armstrong, 2015). 
Still, challenges exist for academics to overcome in New Media research. These include 
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the speed of digital information dissemination and technology evolution, the integration of 
intervening variables, accurate real-time measurement of relationships between physical 




The pace at which information spreads online clearly exceeds physical word of mouth. 
Tracing such activity in real time necessitates knowing which accounts to view, which 
hashtags to follow, and even which platforms are being utilized. While this information 
can often be found in short periods of time, many platforms, including Twitter and its 
streaming Application Programming Interface (API), do not have options for downloading 
all types of data after they have occurred. Sites like Tweekdeck, Topsy, and 
TwapperKeeper can facilitate this task; however, they are often cost-prohibitive. Likewise, 
the pace at which platform utilization evolves often exceeds scholars’ ability to accurately 
and comprehensively utilize them for data collection. This challenge in particular, is likely 
to be a persistent one, and keeping current with the evolution of new technology is one of 




One of the main questions scholars wrestle with in regard to the Arab Spring is to what 
degree can we attribute the success of each uprising to social media utilization? Measuring 
the amount of impact we can ascribe to New Media in events such as the Arab Spring must 
also be inclusive of the additional facets that contribute to movement momentum, many of 
them discussed in preceding portions of this paper. Issues such as existing political 
structures, accessibility and transparency of current leadership, social capital within a 
protest or revolution movement, historical economic climate, and many other factors will 
also impact the process and success of any political uprising. As a result, academics must 
be careful not to attribute unwarranted causality to social media utilization. To counter this 
tendency, rigor in methodology and research that integrates multiple disciplinary 
perspectives will improve the quality and validity of conclusions. 
 
Connecting the Physical and the Digital 
 
As mentioned above, Howard et al. (2011) and others (Breuer, Landman, & Farquhar, 
2014; Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013; Hussain & Howard, 2013; LeFebrve & 
Armstrong, 2015) have succeeded in mapping the spread of hashtags geographically and 
have traced the spread of articles, photos, and other content via multiple social media 
platforms. Connecting this information to physical protest turnout, however, necessitates 
an ability to gauge the actual trigger that drives protesters to participate. The question of 
exactly how much power social media platforms have in driving citizens to engage in 
physical protests requires the ability to interact with protesters. Onuch (2014) achieved this 
in Ukraine’s EuroMaidan protests by taking to the streets and conducting surveys with 
protest participants including asking them how they found out about the protests, and which 
social media platforms, if any, contributed to their decision to participate. Aside from this 
direct approach, researchers who cannot be physically present will continue to struggle 
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with connecting social media engagement and physical protest participation. Again 
however, even when these connections are made, the success of a protest movement must 
be carefully described, and correlation with social media use cannot be automatically be 




No two social networking platforms are alike. This makes the task of digital data collection 
a complex process. Many texting applications, including Kik, WhatsApp, Send, 
TextSecure, Telegram, Viber, and others all work privately, allowing people to pass 
information one-on-one, or in small groups. The content and associated metadata, however, 
are typically not available for public consumption or visible in any type of newsfeed, thus 
making analysis virtually impossible, unless content is provided by either sender or 
recipient.  
 More commonly, scholars rely on content from public platforms like YouTube, 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Ask.fm, and others. These social media sites allow 
researchers to collect large quantities of data. Their variation in access, however, is also 
highly diverse. For example, Twitter allows anyone to access tweet content and metadata 
through their API. Developer registration and authentication keys are readily available and 
allow researchers to collect data via both the streaming and searching APIs. From this, 
tweet content, geographic location, likes, favorites, followers, and much more information 
can be collected either in real time by streaming information through users or hashtags, and 
also going back in time searching by user. 
 Platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram are less helpful and do not provide 
the same flexible interfacing options. Much of their content can be manually collected, 
however. Additionally, software like NVivo’s Ncapture tool collects data (from Facebook 
and Twitter) and organizes it into spreadsheets for simple analysis or import into other 
analysis programs.  
 The lack of consistency, and again, the speed at which platforms rise and fall from 
popular use make it challenging to conduct the same analysis across multiple platforms. 
Along with this, many users tend to use multiple platforms, and this cross-pollination of 
information and content can be difficult to disaggregate. As a result, we see a large amount 
of research available and emerging from platforms that provide access and little from those 
that do not. This basic challenge of access is not new to academics. Indeed it plagues 
research projects across the globe and has no simple solution. Enhancement of available 
tools and persistence in seeking new avenues of access when appropriate is one of the only 
ways to temper this challenge. 
 Clearly, New Media are accessible for data collection and research. There are 
however, genuine difficulties for researchers. Over time, we will see a refinement in 
methodology, an evolution in theoretical perspectives, and advancement of knowledge in 
the field. In the meantime, we must take care to consider all the challenges to this progress, 
and work diligently to counter them. Contentious political climates across the globe like 
the ones we observed during the Arab Spring will provide continuing opportunities to build 
on the foundations of New Media and protest research currently available. Collaboration, 
scrupulousness, and continual methodological fine-tuning are our best tools for this task 
and its hurdles.  




The most compelling feature of the Arab Spring was undoubtedly the dominance of the 
role of young Arabs in jump-starting the Arab uprisings both online and on the street. 
However, to view the Arab Spring—the most significant historical game changer in the 
Arab world since the fall of the Ottoman Empire—merely as Arab members of the Global 
Generation using their social media accounts to protest against economic deprivation, 
injustice, and corruption in their countries does not do much justice to the Arab Spring or 
the Global Generation. Participation in the events of the Arab Spring was obviously much 
broader and deeper than what was viewed on YouTube, seen on Facebook or followed on 
Twitter or any other New Media platform. Yes, New Media provided Arab revolutionaries 
with tools that could connect them with news and information they needed to participate 
in their country’s ongoing contentious politics; collaborate with other people—including 
those within their community, country, and other Arab (and non-Arab) countries; and 
create new content, and channels of communication that helped them deliver information, 
mobilize, organize, and take collective action.  
 While the New Media technologies did not necessarily make the young Arab users 
more inclined towards democracy, they appeared to provide these young revolutionaries 
with channels for “cognitive liberation” from the state controlled media as a prerequisite 
to taking to the streets to protest. Before taking to the streets to liberate society from 
dictatorship, revolutionaries found cognitive liberation in the free flow of information 
online. In the New Media available to them, they found highly effective tools to plan, 
organize, mobilize, and take action in their countries, as well as share their successes and 
setbacks with Arab peers across the borders. It is no mere coincidence that the most 
expeditious and ultimately successful uprisings occurred in Arab countries that had had 
large and active online public spheres: Tunisia and Egypt.  
 Given the on-going importance of the relationship between New Media and 
democratization movements in the Arab world, there is urgent need for a new set of 
analytical tools and procedures for study, comparison, and explanation of the complex roles 
the New Media plays vis-á-vis various national and transnational forms of political 
participation and debate. Undoubtedly, the increased transparency that these almost 
instantaneous communication provide needs to be better understood and appreciated for its 
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